By 1970 Pep’s rapid growth
and impressive results led to Pep being named by Business South Africa as South
Africa’s largest and fastest-growing clothing retailing organization, while South Africa’s largest newspaper, Sunday
Times, described the matric-educated 38-year old Renier as ‘having that
Harvard look’. There was
also growing corporate and investor interest in the company. In 1969 the giant
Edgars Stores entered into negotiations with Renier to buy Pep for a R4
million, an attractive offer at the time. After proper consideration and consultation,
he rejected the offer on the grounds that Pep’s shareholder/employees - who,
together with the directors owned 90 per cent of the company’s 3.4 million
issued shares - clearly indicated that they preferred to be working as an
independent entity rather than as part of a bigger organization.
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Rapid
expansion, however, was a costly business and necessitated more capital. To
address this ongoing problem Pep announced in August 1971 that it was issuing
350,000 shares in a private placement. Encouraged by the huge
interest shown in this private placement and buoyed by a 100% increase in
turnover during the first five months of the 1971 financial year, Pep Stores applied for a listing on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange by 1972.
In 1971 a huge fire caused by suspected electrical short circuit
swept through the main warehouse and headquarters of Pep Stores in Kuilsrivier,
destroying goods estimated at about R1 million (in 2010 terms, approximately
R100m). Although
the immediate psychological impact of the fire on Pep’ staff was considerable,
it was buffered by Renier’s calm demeanor and him posture of being in total
command of the crisis even when the flames were towering up to 100 meters
above ground level. One of the Pep
employees, Pietro Tito, a manager of the Stiletto factory, recalled seeing
Renier late at night, with his eyes red from the smoke, standing in the ruins
but already busy planning the reconstruction of the warehouse. In spite of the damage and
destruction, it soon was business as usual and the financial impact on Pep as a
whole was not too serious. Fortunately, the building and the stock were fully
insured and Pep’s insurance claim was deftly handled by the newly-appointed
appointed financial director, Whitey Basson. The
relatively minor effect of the fire on Pep’s business activities and the ease
with which Pep recovered from this temporary setback were evident from the
results for the year ending February 1972 - in spite of the disruption the
company managed to double its turnover to R22 million, increase its pretax
profit to R1,4 million and earnings per share by 52 percent.
With Pep’s market segmented
at the time into 30 per cent white, 40 per cent coloured and only 27 per cent
black, and with more than half its stores located in the Cape, it became
obvious that the company had hardly scratched the surface of the much greater
populated and economically stronger northern provinces where the vast majority
of South Africa’s black population resided. With a sound management team (newly
appointed to the board of directors were Tom Ball, Basil Basil Wyers, and
alternately, Whitey Basson and Frank Weetman) and supported by 3,500 loyal and
enthusiastic employees (many with shares in the firm, except coloured and
blacks who were not allowed by law to hold shares), Pep Stores was
exceptionally well- placed for further expansion and for its listing on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 7 June 1972.
In
the brochure which accompanied the 1972 annual report entitled ‘Pep Stores, A
Successful Marketing Concept’, Renier explained to the financial world what Pep
was all about: he defined Pep’s target market as the working lower income
people of South Africa, who, as individuals, had little money to spend, but
collectively possessed an enormous purchasing power’; he described Pep’s sales
philosophy as ‘We do not sell cheap goods - we sell goods cheaply’, and made
reference to the company’s plans to continue with its program for vertical
diversification: ‘We intend to manufacture many of the mass-produced items sold
in our stores, ourselves, in this way we can exert even greater control over
our stock, quality and price’. He
portrayed the ‘typical’ Pep store as follows: ‘coming into a store the customer
enters a different world in which luxurious interior fittings is viewed with suspicion’
and one in which the impression is ‘purposefully created that overnight all the
stock was thrown together without plan or pattern - while in fact, the layout
has been planned in detail and has been the result of many years of
experimentation’. The brochure also dealt with Pep’s proud reputation of
honesty: ‘We don’t sell rubbish - at a given price our wares are of a good
quality, a fact realized by our customers -
poor people are not stupid - they cannot afford to be’.
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The results
of the financial year in 1973 confirmed what most investors already expected,
namely that Pep’s astounding growth rate had only just begun. The company
managed to double its taxed profits from R883,000 to R1,6 million while sales
increased from R22 million to R34 million and earnings per share up from 20c to
33c. The number of retail outlets increased from 163 to 222. For the investors
in Pep’s shares this growth rate was a boon - the price of Pep’s shares had
climbed from its opening price of R2.75 nine months earlier, to over R5 in
April 1973, bringing the total equity market capitalization to almost R25
million.
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If there
were any minor concerns about rising inventory levels and slower turnover,
these were overshadowed by Pep’s past record and the fact that the firm by
early 1975 had assembled a sound management team capable of ensuring future
growth. Apart from Renier, now both chairman and managing director (director
Christo Wiese left in 1973 as a full-time director to resume his legal career),
the senior management consisted of Basil Weyers (director in charge of
marketing and buying), Frank Weetman (national sales manager); Tom Ball
(director in charge of manufacturing), Wellwood (Whitey) Basson (group
financial manager), Willem Delport (company secretary), Ben Combrinck (manager
of CMT), Klaus Kuhn (technical manager in charge of factory planning) and Danie
Theart (personnel manager). Renier’s brother Gert, and sister, Baba, were in
charge respectively of men’s and women’s buying, supported by a team of 14
buyers who were responsible for control and standardization of quality.
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